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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sustaining jurisdiction in problematical cases: the agreement to in-
demnify could be deemed implicitly to include the burden of de-
fending in any forum where the indemnitee is forced to litigate.
Although Ferrante displays something of a jurisdictional paralysis,
Aquascutum suggests that the outer limits of CPLR 302(a)(1) are yet
to be reached.
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii): 1 percent of gross income does not constitute "sub-
stantial revenue from interstate commerce."
Responding to the Court of Appeals decision in Feathers v. Mc-
Lucas,14 the Judicial Conference recommended passage' 5 of what is
now CPLR 302(a)(3).' 1 Although designed to afford protection to New
York residents injured within the state by foreign tortfeasors who could
not otherwise be reached under the long-arm statute,' 7 the restrictions
contained in this subsection are such that the courts have ample lati-
tude within which to safeguard the rights of nonresident defendants.'"
Gluck v. Fasig Tipton Co.19 provides a recent example of judicial un-
willingness to extend CPLR 302(a)(3) to the point where the burden
of defending an action in New York would be oppressive.
In Gluck the plaintiff alleged fraud and breach of warranty arising
out of the sale of a mare at an auction in Saratoga, New York. In
addition to the seller and the auctioneer, a Kentucky-based veterinar-
ian, who, allegedly, falsely certified the mare to be pregnant, was named
as a defendant. The latter's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
was granted despite plaintiff's contention that both CPLR 302(a)(2)
and (a)(3) provided the court with personal jurisdiction.
14 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
15 Report to the 1966 Legislature in Relation to the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
TWFLFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
12, 15, 17 (1967) [hereinafter TWELFTH REP.].
'6 CPLR 302(a)(3) states that a nondomiciliary will be subject to in personam juris-
diction in New York when he
commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state, . . . if he . . . (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act
to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate
or international commerce....
17For example, under CPLR 302(a)(2) the tortious act must be committed within
the state. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). See
generally 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary at 139-41 (1965).
18 In safeguarding the nonresident's rights, the New York courts are also protecting
a New York domiciliary since the "[e]nthusiasm for extending jurisdiction over foreign
persons . . . in limited contact cases, . . . may well be tempered by the expectation
that the same rule will be reciprocally applied in remote countries against our citizens
here." A. Millner Co. v. Noudar LDA, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289, 294
(1st Dep't 1966).
19 63 Misc. 2d 82, 310 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
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As to CPLR 302(a)(2), the court, relying chiefly upon the restric-
tive interpretation found in Feathers v. McLucas20 and Kramer v.
Vogl,21 held that the fraud was not committed within the state and
that neither the owner nor auctioneer could be considered agents of the
veterinarian.
With reference to CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), the court was willing to
assume that the veterinarian had expected his act to have consequences
in New York. Nonetheless, in view of uncontradicted income figures
furnished by defendant, which demonstrated that he derived less than
1 percent of his gross income from services rendered outside Kentucky,
the court ruled that defendant had not derived "substantial revenue
from interstate or international commerce."22
Determining whether or not a particular defendant has derived
"substantial revenue from interstate commerce" is a difficult task be-
cause no precise guidelines have been fixed.2 3 Undoubtedly, utilizing
a percentage of interstate income in relation to total income criterion
is one method of measuring a defendant's ability to handle out-of-
state litigation.24 However, it should not be viewed as the sole criterion
of substantial revenue; instead, courts should also consider the volume
of income derived from interstate commerce 25 Admittedly, the Gluck
outcome would not have been different if this test were applied inas-
much as the volume of interstate income did not amount to more than
$7,000 in any of the three years for which figures were supplied.
Nevertheless, if a particular defendant's 1 percent interstate income
amounts to $50,000 or more, is he not in a better position to defend
a New York action than a defendant whose 10 percent interstate in-
come amounts to $25,000?
20 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
21 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966) (defendant in Austria made
false representations to induce plaintiff to become its exclusive agent in New York).
22The conditions listed under CPLR 302(a)(8)(i) are used alternatively. However,
under subparagraph (ii) both conditions must be met. See TWELFrH REP. 21.
23 The Judicial Conference was of the opinion that the amendment should not be
construed so as to secure jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose business operations are
of a local character. TwELFrH REp. 21. In fact, its report intimates that the defendant
should be engaged in "extensive" interstate activities. Id. at 18.
24 Cf. Chunky v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 299 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
It is generally accepted that one who is substantially involved in interstate commerce
is well-equipped to hande litigation away from his primary business location. See 1
WK&-M 302.10a.
25 In determining what constitutes "substantial revenue" under CPLR 302(a)(3)(i),
the courts have applied both the percentage and dollar volume tests. See, e.g., Gillmore v.
Inskip, 54 Misc. 2d 218, 282 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967).
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